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CLIMATE REFUGEES REQUIRE RELOCATION
ASSISTANCE: GUARANTEEING ADEQUATE LAND
ASSETS THROUGH TREATIES BASED ON THE
NATIONAL ADAPTATION PROGRAMMES OF ACTION
Holly D. Lange†
Abstract: Rising ocean levels in the South Pacific threaten thousands of
inhabitants with displacement. Many of these small Pacific island states lack available
land to internally accommodate displaced individuals. Thus, thousands of “climate
refugees” will be forced to move off their island homes and, without provisions of
adequate land rights, will most likely end up in refugee camps in other countries.
Climate change exemplifies an inherently global challenge. Developed countries
produce disproportionately more greenhouse gases, and developing countries lack
resources to adequately respond to climatic displacement. International treaties establish
a legal responsibility to assist developing states adapt to climate change. However, these
treaties inadequately provide support to vulnerable Pacific states like Kiribati, a low-lying
South Pacific island nation. The Kiribati-United States Friendship Treaty, the South
Pacific Regional Environment Programme Agreement, and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change all suggest legal responsibilities for the
United States and other developed states to assist Kiribati’s climate adaptation efforts, but
each treaty regime ultimately fails to elicit international response because the terms are
vague and lack enforcement mechanisms. A future treaty regime based on the National
Adaptation Programmes of Action must establish a system to respond to climatic
displacement by creating adequate land rights provisions.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The effects of climate change may displace two hundred million
people both internally and across national borders by the middle of the
twenty-first century.1 In recent years, increased frequency and severity of
natural disasters pushed people from their homes on an unprecedented
scale.2 Rising ocean levels, in particular, will likely displace thousands of
the world’s first climate refugees3 in the South Pacific. Rising ocean levels
†
The author would like to thank Professor Sylvia Kang'ara for her guidance, the editorial staff at the
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their assistance, and her friends and family for their constant
support.
1
See Office of the United Nations High Comm’n for Refugees, Forced Displacement in the Context
of Climate Change: Challenges for States Under International Law, May 20, 2009, http://www.unhcr.org/
4a1e4d8c2.html (last visited May 22, 2010) [hereinafter UNHCR, Forced Displacement].
2
Dana Zartner Falstron, Stemming the Flow of Environmental Displacement: Creating a
Convention to Protect Persons and Preserve the Environment, 2001 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 4
(2001).
3
The term “climate refugee” will be used throughout this Comment to refer to individuals displaced
by the effects of climate change. The term has been criticized for sacrificing the dignity of displaced
persons and over-simplifying climatic displacement. See Jane McAdam and Maryanne Loughry, We Aren’t
Refugees, INSIDE STORY: CURRENT AFF. AND CULTURE, June 30, 2009, http://inside.org.au/we-arent-
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could cover whole Pacific island nations, and upon displacement, these
nations of climate refugees will require land rights elsewhere to establish
functioning communities.4
In the South Pacific, more than half of the population lives less than
one and a half kilometers from the shore,5 and within twenty years, the most
heavily populated areas in many South Pacific nations may become
uninhabitable.6 Kiribati’s citizens, the I-Kiribati, 7 who live on low-lying
coral atolls scattered across two million square miles in the Pacific Ocean,
are particularly susceptible to climatic displacement.8 Already the I-Kiribati
experience the effects of rising ocean levels. What will happen to the IKiribati as the ocean consumes their nation? Where will they go? What
refuge and resources will the international community provide? Without
adequate land rights provisions, these people will be scattered throughout the
world in temporary refugee settlements, lacking the resources or collateral to
improve their livelihoods and establish functioning communities.
Climate refugees require adequate land right provisions in future
treaties to ensure effective international resettlement. In this Comment, the
phrase “land rights” refers to relocation and livelihood reestablishment
assistance provided through vested property interests, housing, citizenship,
or other mechanisms designed to ensure climate refugees adequate
resettlement tools. These land rights could be created in other nations
through the establishment of new sovereign territories, or by providing
climate refugees citizenship. Land ownership and relocation assistance
provide climate refugees the opportunity to adapt to their new surroundings
and establish productive communities.9

refugees/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). In fact, Kiribati’s President Tong has said he objects to his people
being labeled environmental refugees, claiming that the title “refugee” comes with a stigma. See NOW
with David Brancaccio, Paradise Lost, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE (Dec. 12, 2008),
http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/449/index.html (last visited May 22, 2010). The author of this Comment
does not intend any disrespect and simply uses the term “climate refugee” as a succinct way to refer to
someone displaced by climate change.
4
The effects of climate change will also cause extensive internal displacement. However, this
Comment addresses international climatic displacement, where entire nations will be displaced, requiring
land rights abroad. See William Gumede, Copenhagen is a Disaster for Africa, ABBAY MEDIA (Ethiopia),
Dec. 23, 2009, http://abbaymedia.com/News/?p=3131 (last visited Apr. 10, 2001).
5
See AlexT., Commonwealth MPs Call for Action on Climate Change, COMMONWEALTH
CONVERSATION, Oct. 15, 2009, http://www.thecommonwealthconversation.org/2009/10/commonwealthmps-call-for-action-on-climate-change/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
6
Id.
7
Citizens of Kiribati refer to themselves as “I-Kiribati.”
8
Paradise Lost, supra note 3.
9
See Simon Levine and Judy Adoko, Land Rights and Displacement in Northern Uganda,
HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE MAG., July 2006, available at http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2813.
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“Studies produced at the request of the World Bank demonstrate that
one of the rudimentary causes of poverty and income inequality is unequal
access to and possession of [land] assets.”10 Despite the value of land rights,
the international community is far from recognizing their necessity. While
existing climate change treaties neglect land rights, they do provide possible
platforms for delineating the land rights necessary to support successful
relocation. Specifically, the Friendship Treaty between the United States and
Kiribati, the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (“SPREP”)
Agreement, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”) all establish legal responsibilities for developed states
to provide assistance to Kiribati to ensure security, protect the environment,
and provide adaptation mechanisms for climatic displacement.11 Each of
these international agreements establishes tenuous legal responsibilities for
developed states to aid or compensate Kiribati for the negative effects of
climate change, but each treaty regime fails to elicit a response from the
international community, and none of the treaties discuss land rights
provisions for climate refugees. The existing framework established through
the UNFCCC’s National Adaptation Programmes of Action (“NAPA”) plan
provides a valuable platform for developing future provisions of land rights
for climate refugees.
This Comment explores the climate challenges facing Kiribati, which
exemplify the need for establishing land rights in international agreements.
Part II details the reality and effects of rising ocean levels in the South
Pacific generally and Kiribati specifically. Further, Part II outlines the
necessity of land rights for climate refugees and explores possible specific
characteristics of land rights provisions. Part III discusses the international
legal mechanisms that could address climatic displacement and land rights,
emphasizing the benefits of treaties. Part III also considers existing
international treaties that create tenuous legal responsibilities for developed
states to provide assistance to address climatic displacement, including the
Friendship Treaty, the SPREP Agreement, and the UNFCCC. Part IV
discusses why these legal obligations are inadequate and what future
agreements ought to include, focusing particularly on land rights provided
through a new treaty based on the National Adaptation Programme of Action
system.
10
Bernadette Atuahene, Legal Title to Land as an Intervention Against Urban Property in
Developing Nations, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1109, 1110 (2004); Nancy Birdsall & Juan Luis
Londono, Asset Inequality Does Matter: Lessons From Latin America 15 (Inter-America Dev. Bank, OCE
Working Paper 1997).
11
See infra Part III.B.
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KIRIBATI FACES DAUNTING CLIMATE CHALLENGES THAT COULD
DISPLACE THE ISLAND’S ENTIRE POPULATION

No nation is safe from climate change, and the effects are already
visible around the world with more frequent and severe storms,
desertification, and rising ocean levels.12 The consequences of climate
change13 will be especially severe in the South Pacific where rising sea
levels threaten to overtake low-lying islands in the next century.14
Widespread displacement results in refugee camps with significant health
and security risks.15
A.

Anthropogenic Release of Greenhouse Gases Causes Global Warming

Human behavior since the Industrial Revolution resulted in increased
levels of greenhouse gases.16 The scientific community largely agrees that
greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide, alter the Earth’s natural
systems.17 While skeptics insist that these climatic changes are part of a
natural global cycle, 18 this Comment starts from the position that the climate
is changing as a result of human behavior.
Rising sea levels represent one of the most serious consequences of
global warming.19 Water expands as it warms, and warmer waters both

12
See Richard Neil Ilagan, Obama Administration: Global Warming Effects are Everywhere, DAILY
CONTRIBUTOR, June 17 2009, http://dailycontributor.com/obama-administration-global-warming-effectsare-everywhere/5565/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
13
The terms “climate change” and “global warming” will be used interchangeably throughout this
Comment.
14
Alexander Gillespie, Small Island States in the Face of Climate Change: The End of the Line in
International Environmental Responsibility, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 107, 113 (2004); See Lester R.
Brown, Rising Sea Level Forcing Evacuation of Island Country, EARTH POL’Y INST., Nov. 15, 2001,
http://www.earthpolicy.org/index.php?/plan_b_updates/2001/update2 (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
15
David A. Martin, Migration and Refuge in the Twenty-First Century: A Symposium in Memory of
Arthur Helton: A New Era for U.S. Refugee Resettlement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 299, 317 (2005).
16
Sarah A. Peay, Joining the Asia-Pacific Partnership: The Environmentally Sound Decision? 18
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 477, 479 (2007).
17
Anthony Oliver-Smith, Climate Change and Population Displacement: Disasters and Diasporas
in the Twenty-First Century, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: FROM ENCOUNTERS TO ACTIONS
117 (Susan A. Crate & Mark Nuttal eds., 2009); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (S. Solomon et
al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC REPORT 2007]; Naomi Oreskes, The Ivory Tower: The Scientific
Consensus on Climate Change, SCIENCE, Dec. 3, 2004, at 1686, http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/
full/306/5702/1686 (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
18
See Doug L. Hoffman, Global Warming Predictions Invalidated, RESILIENT EARTH, Nov. 5, 2009,
http://www.theresilientearth.com/?q=content/global-warming-predictions-invalidated (last visited Apr. 5,
2010).
19
Oliver-Smith, supra note 17, at 117.
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directly cause ocean levels to rise and cause ice to melt at the polar caps.20 A
2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) report
conservatively estimates that sea levels could rise between nearly one foot
and 1.9 feet by the end of the twenty-first century.21 “The crux of the sea
level issue is that it starts very slowly but once it gets going it is practically
unstoppable.”22 Even if international society reaches zero emissions, sea
levels will continue to rise at a steady rate for centuries.23 Thus, the
international conversation surrounding climate change responses must
adequately consider the effects of global warming and shift the policy debate
to adaptation mechanisms, including methods to respond appropriately to
climatic displacement.
B.

Kiribati Faces Serious Climate Impacts as a Vulnerable, Low-Lying
Pacific Island

Kiribati’s geography, political history, and economy leave the country
vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Kiribati consists of thirty-three
tiny coral atolls, dispersed over nearly two million square miles, straddling
the equator between Hawaii and Australia.24 Despite its expansive ocean
territory, the habitable land in Kiribati would fit within New York City’s
limits,25 and only 100,000 people live in Kiribati.26 Kiribati struggled with
foreign occupation until its independence in 1977, and the islands remain
plagued by economic and political instability.27

20
John H. Knox, Symposium: Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477, 479 (2009).
21
IPCC REPORT 2007, supra note 17; Cristine Russell, First Wave: The presidents of Two Island
Nations Draft Escape Plans, Anticipating Sea Level Rise, SCIENCE NEWS, Feb. 28, 2009, at 24.
22
See Gerard Wynn, Two Meter Sea Level Rise Unstoppable, REUTERS (Oxford), Sept. 30, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58S4L420090930 (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
23
Denis Culley, Note, Global Warming, Sea Level Rise and Tort, 8 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 91, 99
(2002); What can you do about a Vanishing Nation? See “The President’s Dilemma,” Coming Up on BBC
World,
INT’L
FUND
FOR
AGRIC.
DEV.,
Dec.
11,
2009
[hereinafter
IFAD],
http://www.ifad.org/media/video/kiribati/index.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2010); Wynn, supra note 22.
24
CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, AUSTRALIA-OCEANIA: KIRIBATI, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kr.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2010); Paradise Lost, supra note 3.
25
New York City’s limits measure approximately 320 square miles. CHRISTINA WONG, PHYSICS
FACTBOOK:
AREA
OF
NEW
YORK
CITY
(Glenn
Elert
ed.,
2002),
http://hypertextbook.com/facts/2002/JordanLevine1.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
26
The population of New York City, according to the 2008 Census Bureau Estimate, is 19,490,297.
NYC.gov, Population: Current Population Estimate, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popcur
.shtml (last visited May 22, 2010); IFAD, supra note 23.
27
See Kiribati-History, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/
Asia-and-Oceania/Kiribati-HISTORY.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010); CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra
note 24.
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Kiribati is one of the least developed Pacific Islands with a wildly
fluctuating economy highly dependent on foreign aid.28 The islands’
valuable phosphate reserves were exhausted at the time of independence,
and further economic development is constrained by a shortage of skilled
workers, a weak infrastructure, and remoteness from international markets.29
Tourism provides more than one-fifth of Kiribati’s gross domestic product
(“GDP”), and twenty to twenty-five percent of the GDP comes from foreign
financial aid.30 With inadequate resources to respond to climate change,31
the effects of climate change will disrupt the daily lives and health of the IKiribati, eventually forcing migration off the islands. However, most IKiribati will not be able to purchase new land abroad.
1.

Climate Change Damages Agriculture, Biodiversity, Economics,
Health, and Culture on Kiribati

A 1.9 foot rise in sea level would dramatically alter life on Kiribati
through direct encroachment of water and saltwater intrusion into soil and
freshwater sources.32 Most of the islands of Kiribati are less than two meters
above sea level.33 Two uninhabited Kiribati islands, Tebua and Bikeman,
have already vanished completely.34 In the coming decades, rising ocean
levels will “drown” Kiribati, forcing displacement of the I-Kiribati.35
Inhabitants of low-lying islands in the South Pacific like Kiribati face
serious, daily effects of climate change including: loss of land, loss of
homes, storm surges, damaged marine ecosystems, disrupted food sources,
compromised fresh drinking water, and loss of livelihoods connected to the
ocean or tourism.36 For example, scientists predict that salinization will
make low-lying Pacific Islands uninhabitable long before water actually
28

CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 24.
Id.
30
Id.
31
Culley, supra note 23, at 106.
32
IFAD, supra note 23; IPCC REPORT 2007, supra note 17.
33
Gillespie, supra note 14, at 113.
34
Rebecca Tsosie, The Change of Environmental Justice: Taking Stock: Indigenous People and
Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1637 (2007); Paradise
Lost, supra note 3; Daniel Williams, There's Debate About the Causes, But Rising Seas Are Lapping Away
the Edges of Tiny Island Nations-and Could Eventually Drown Them, TIME PACIFIC, Aug. 27, 2001,
http://www.time.com/time/pacific/magazine/20010820/climate.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
35
See David Perlman, Oceans Rising Fast, New Studies Find, SF GATE, Mar. 24, 2006,
http://articles.sfgate.com/2006-03-24/news/17284797_1_level-rise-sea-ice-sea-level (last visited Apr. 10,
2010).
36
Ruth Gordon, The Climate of Environmental Justice: Taking Stock: Climate Change and the
Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on Global Inequity, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1559, 1595 (2007); Tsosie,
supra note 34, at 1636.
29
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overtakes the islands.37 The islands’ porous coral foundations allow
saltwater intrusion into freshwater sources.38 Saltwater intrusion into
freshwater and the soil destroys agricultural productivity.39 In addition to
damaging agriculture, salinization also causes a loss of adequate drinking
water.40
Rising ocean levels impact island lifestyle beyond the direct effects on
agriculture and human heath.41 With livelihoods changed by a loss of
tourism and a loss of fishing resources, island inhabitants will be forced to
seek alternative lifestyles and employment opportunities.42
2.

Rising Ocean Levels Force Coastal Communities from their Homes

With threats to agriculture, biodiversity, the economy, health, and
culture on Kiribati, its citizens must consider eventual relocation. Most of
Kiribati’s 94,000 shoreline village residents face the prospect of
displacement; some have already relocated from century-old sites.43
Kiribati’s President Anote Tong says of relocation, “We’re doing it now . . .
it’s that urgent.”44 President Tong actively addresses the international
displacement of the I-Kiribati, proposing relocation in Australia and New
Zealand.45 When Tong was asked whether he would eventually divide his
people among other nations, Tong replied, “The question is, do I have a
choice?”46
C.

Adequate Land Rights are Essential for Successful Climatic
Relocation Efforts

When island nations like Kiribati are displaced due to rising ocean
levels, land rights must be carefully considered and incorporated into the
international response to ensure successful relocation efforts. In the South
37

IFAD, supra note 23.
See Water Plan Helps Sinking Kiribati Stay Afloat, PACIFIC ISLANDS BROAD. ASS’N, Mar. 3, 2009,
http://sealevelrise.blogspot.com/2009/03/water-plan-helps-sinking-kiribati-stay.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2010).
39
Gordon, supra note 36, at 1595, 1596; Tsosie, supra note 34, at 1636.
40
Tsosie, supra note 34, at 1636.
41
See Jonathan Adams, Rising Sea Levels Threaten Small Pacific Island Nations, N.Y. TIMES, May
3, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/03/world/asia/03iht-pacific.2.5548184.html?_r=1.
42
Gordon, supra note 36, at 1597; Gillespie, supra note 14, at 114; Paradise Lost, supra note 3.
43
See Climate Change Pushes Kiribati Underwater, GSTAAD PROJECT, June 15, 2008,
http://gstaadblog.wordpress.com/2008/06/15/climate-change-pushes-kiribati-underwater/ (last visited Apr.
10, 2010).
44
Id.
45
Knox, supra note 20, at 498.
46
Paradise Lost, supra note 3.
38
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Pacific, people view their ancestral land plots as part of themselves and part
of their families.47 Thus, land on Kiribati is not considered a fungible
commodity.48
In its set of Key Messages and Recommendations to State Parties to
the UNFCCC, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (“UNHCR”) explained the necessity of assisting climate-induced
migrations.49 In order to accommodate climate-induced migrants, states
receiving climate refugees must provide adequate land rights.50 Secure land
rights facilitate economic development including increasing productivity,
improving efficiency of land use, increasing access to credit, increasing
investments in the land, increasing the value of the land, reducing
environmental degradation, and creating political stability.51 These benefits
allow climate refugees to resettle successfully.
Despite its necessity, creating treaty regimes and international
solutions to climatic displacement remains daunting. Individual landowners
will lose their land due to rising ocean levels. If international legal
mechanisms do not include adequate land rights provisions, climatic
displacement will result in climate refugee camps scattered around the
world. Providing land ownership and adequate land rights allows families to
produce their own food, raise money, take out loans, and improve their
economic positioning.52 Without land rights, climate refugees from lowlying islands like Kiribati will remain a transient population, continually
dependent on the international community to supply basic services.53
Efforts to provide land rights to climate refugees face a number of
challenges, beyond acquiring funding and assistance from developed states.
Governments and non-governmental organizations involved in the relocation
47

See RON CROCOMBE, Overview: The Pattern of Change in Pacific Land Tenures, in LAND TENURE
PACIFIC 3 (Selwyn Artangai et al. eds., 1987). This Comment makes generalizations about the
overall necessity of adequate land rights provisions, without delving into the unique make-up of individual
South Pacific land tenure systems, which vary dramatically from island to island in modern nations.
48
Id. at 4.
49
UNHCR, Forced Displacement, supra note 1.
50
“States should consider establishing alternative forms of protection for those persons who do not
qualify as refugees but whose return is not feasible or not reasonable due to circumstances in the place of
origin an/or personal conditions, including particular vulnerabilities. They should ensure that migration.”
Id.
51
Tim Hanstad, Roy L. Prosterman & Robert Mitchell, Poverty, Law and Land Tenure Reform, in
ONE BILLION RISING: LAW, LAND AND THE ALLEVIATION OF GLOBAL POVERTY 36, 36 (Roy L. Prosterman
et al. eds., 2009).
52
Roy L. Prosterman & Tim Hanstad, Land Reform in the Twenty-First Century: New Challenges,
New Responses, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 763, 763 (2006).
53
See Dale Buscher, Why Refugees Need to Make a Living, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 11, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dale-buscher/why-refugees-need-to-make_b_256589.html (last visited Apr.
10, 2010).
IN THE
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and land rights provision process must be mindful of mistakes of past
relocation efforts, appropriate titling systems, and location selection.54
1.

Relocation Projects Must Avoid the Mistakes of Past Projects in
Selecting a Location and Supporting the Relocated Community

In providing land ownership in new locations, governments must be
careful not to fall into the same traps as historic relocation efforts.
Government policies to redistribute significant plots of titled land in isolated
areas tend to produce high concentrations of poverty.55 For example, in
World Bank funded dam projects that include forcible removal programs like
the Narmada Dam in India,56 individuals have been stripped of their land and
placed in resettlement colonies that lack sufficient services and economic
opportunities for the colony inhabitants.57 Further, past resettlement
programs have proven extremely costly with establishment of agricultural
production in the new region, development of infrastructure, and
construction of housing, schools, and hospitals.58
2.

Relocation Sites Play a Vital Role in Determining the Success of a
Project

Because entire Pacific states like Kiribati will be displaced by climate
change, selecting a destination for relocation in foreign nations presents an
additional challenge. Where should the land come from? Acquiring existing
public land seems like a natural solution, but the land may be inadequate,
squatters may use the land already, and the land could be distant from
existing communities and infrastructure.59 Land ought to be acquired
through market-based mechanisms, whereby governments, international
organizations, or beneficiaries acquire land through the market, buying and
selling the land like any private actor.60 Voluntary sale of land results in
54
This section assumes that someday climate change will displace entire South Pacific nations,
forcing entire countries to relocate abroad.
55
Atuahene, supra note 10, at 1119.
56
Patrick McCully, Resolution on Narmada and the World Bank on the Occasion of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the World Bank, 26 BULLETIN CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 90 (1994), available at
http://criticalasianstudies.org/assets/files/bcas/v26n04.pdf.
57
Dana L. Clark, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights: The World Bank and Human Rights:
The Need for Greater Accountability, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205, 213 (2001).
58
Roy L. Prosterman, Redistributing Land to Agricultural Laborers, in ONE BILLION RISING: LAW,
LAND AND THE ALLEVIATION OF GLOBAL POVERTY 123 (Roy L. Prosterman et al. eds., 2009); Clark, supra
note 57, at 221.
59
Prosterman, supra note 58, at 125.
60
Id. at 129.
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fewer conflicts, and the land may be carefully selected. Locations must be
geographically strategic, located near sources of employment, productive
land, and infrastructure.61 Ultimately, the quality of the resettlement location
plays a major role in the success of the relocation.62
Despite challenges associated with acquiring adequate land rights,
selecting land location, and acquiring adequate funding, these measures are
necessary to prevent climate refugees from living in refugee camps around
the world without the means to improve their positions. Land rights
represent a vital component in future legal regimes that address climate
change and climate displacement for people like the I-Kiribati.
3.

Successful Relocation Projects Require Participation by the
International Community

The displacement of entire nations represents an unprecedented
international emergency, and the international community must prepare to
respond adequately. As discussed below, treaties represent the appropriate
international legal mechanism to facilitate the relocation of displaced
populations. As such displacement is an inherently international problem,
treaties appropriately provide a binding international solution.
Countries may decide to opt into future climate treaties for a number
of reasons. First, countries may feel that their own security interests will be
served.63 In fact, the United States Department of Defense acknowledges
that global warming represents the biggest threat to national security.64 With
the United States’ heightened interest in security in the past few years, the
United States could decide to sign onto a climatic displacement treaty.65
“Desperation breeds violence,” and countries could avoid internal and
international disputes by providing land rights to climate refugees.66

61

Atuahene, supra note 10, at 1120.
Id.
63
Michael J. Kelly, Ten Questions: Responses to the Ten Questions, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
5059, 5062 (2009).
64
Id.
65
See Kate Sheppard, National Security Emphasis Could Inspire Support for Climate Bill, GRIST,
July 22, 2009, http://www.grist.org/article/2009-07-22-national-security-support-climate-bill-john-warner/
(last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
66
Paul J. Smith, Geography and the Boundaries of Confidence: Military Responses to the Global
Migration Crisis: A Glimpse of Things to Come? 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 77 , 79 (1999); Desperation
Breeds Violence in Haiti, EURO NEWS, Jan. 18, 2010, http://www.euronews.net/2010/01/18/desperationbreeds-violence-in-haiti/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
62
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Second, developed countries are responsible for causing climate change,67 so
assisting climate refugees takes on a compensatory nature.
III.

A NEW TREATY REGIME MUST BE CREATED TO OVERCOME THE
INADEQUACIES OF EXISTING TREATIES AND ESTABLISH LAND RIGHTS
FOR CLIMATE REFUGEES FROM COUNTRIES LIKE KIRIBATI

Current climate-related treaties fail to establish sufficient enforceable
legal obligations to assist with climatic displacement for countries like
Kiribati. No existing treaties explicitly mention climate refugees, yet a new
treaty represents the most appropriate legal mechanism to provide land
rights to climate refugees.
A.

Treaties Represent the Appropriate Legal Mechanism to Provide Land
Rights to Climate Refugees

Academics advance four international legal principles to address
climate change.68 Options for providing land rights include litigation, the
“responsibility to protect” doctrine, human rights norms, and existing
refugee laws. Ultimately, treaties represent the best method for responding
to climatic displacement because these four options fall short of providing
land rights for climate refugees.
1.

Litigation to Provide Land Rights for Climate Refugees will not
Adequately Respond to the Scope of Climatic Displacement

Litigation is a possible mechanism for bringing climate-related
claims, but litigation measures prove inherently ineffective. Litigation does
not immediately address root problems of climatic displacement because
litigation often only serves to identify punitive measures.69 Also, litigation
does not guarantee results—courts could decide that climate refugees are not
entitled to land rights.70 Further, states like Tuvalu, another low-lying
Pacific state that threatened to bring suit based on climate change against the
United States and Australia in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”),

67
Paul G Harris, Common But Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and United States
Policy, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 27, 33 (1999).
68
See infra Part III.A.1-4.
69
Colleen P. Murphy, National Interest: The “Bedbug” Case and State Farm v. Campbell, 9 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 579, 582 (2004).
70
Martha Middleton and Viki Quade, Corporations Hunt Ways to Cut Legal Costs, 68 A.B.A. J. 523
(1982).
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struggle with proving causation.71
Developed states produce
disproportionately more emissions, but it is difficult to prove in court that
one developed nation’s emissions caused particular consequences in another
country.72
Thus, litigation alone is inadequate to address climatic
displacement and provide land rights; indeed, no case has been brought by
an island state to establish land rights upon international displacement.
2.

The “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine is not Established
International Customary Law and Climatic Displacement Falls
Outside its Limited Scope

The international legal principle of a “responsibility to protect”
(“R2P”) arguably could be invoked to provide land rights to climate
refugees, although the doctrine probably does not extend far enough to cover
climatic displacement. The International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty developed the idea of R2P in a 2001 report.73 The central
theme is that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their citizens
from catastrophe, but when states fail to live up to this obligation, the
international community has a responsibility to protect suffering
individuals.74
The doctrine typically applies to situations of mass murder, rape, and
starvation where a domestic failure to react is “widespread and
systematic,”75 although arguments have been made that the doctrine should
expand to include natural disasters.76 However, reliance on R2P in the
71
Rebecca Elizabeth Jacobs, Comment, Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in Tuvalu’s
Threat to Sue the United States in the International Court of Justice, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 103, 121
(2005); GERMANWATCH, CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGES TUVALU 16 (2004), available at
http://www.germanwatch.org/download/klak/fb-tuv-e.pdf.
72
See Maggie L. Walser, Greenhouse Gas Emissions–Perspectives on the Top 20 Emitters and
Developed Versus Developing Nations, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH, October 5, 2009,
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Greenhouse_gas_emissions:_perspectives_on_the_top_20_emitters_and_de
veloped_versus_developing_nations (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
73
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L.
283, 287 (2004).
74
Carsten Stahn, Notes and Comments: Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging
Legal Norm? 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99 (2007); INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
75
See ASIA-PACIFIC CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS: ASIA-PACIFIC IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 6 (2008),
available at http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/documents/Asia-Pacific%20POC%20june%2008.pdf.
The
principle was first articulated following the genocides in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. Joe Lauria, U.S. Backs
Implementing U.N. Doctrine Against Genocide, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2009 available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124890587995691589.html.
76
Jarrod Wong, Reconstructing the Responsibility to Protect in the Wake of Cyclones and
Separatism, 84 TUL. L. REV. 219, 222 (2009).
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climate change context is tenuous for two reasons. First, the principle has
not yet ripened into widely accepted customary international law.77 Second,
even if the principle does become part of customary international law,
climatic displacement challenges may extend beyond the scope of the
doctrine’s application.78 Further, R2P has never provided land rights to
displaced populations.
3.

Human Rights Norms Fall Short of Providing Adequate Land Rights
to Climate Refugees Because of Inconsistent Enforcement

A number of principles of international human rights law apply to the
climate change challenge, including Articles 6 and 12 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantee a right to life and
recognize the right of freedom of movement and choice of residence.79
Additionally, because climate change directly compromises economic,
social, and cultural rights, it also implicates Articles 6, 11, and 12 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which
guarantee a right to livelihood, food, water, housing, health and an adequate
standard of living.80 Climate change impacts each of these essential human
rights through prevalence of disease, disturbed agricultural and water
sources, displacement, and damaged systems relied on for livelihoods. 81
However, the history of human rights adherence and enforcement
suggests that human rights norms will not adequately provide land rights to
climate refugees. States like Kiribati will face climatic displacement over
the next ten decades due to rising ocean levels.82 History indicates that
human rights movements operate slowly,83 and garnering enough support in
the human rights community could prove difficult in the near future.84
Further, human rights advocates may hesitate to divert valuable resources
77
Tyra Ruth Saechao, Natural Disasters and the Responsibility to Protect: From Chaos to Clarity,
32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 663, 699 (2007).
78
Id. at 707. Increasing awareness among all states regarding a responsibility to protect natural
disaster victims would greatly assist international disaster relief, but given the political nature of
international disaster response, achieving international cooperation is difficult. Id.
79
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 6, 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
80
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights arts. 6, 11, 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 6
I.L.M. 360, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
81
Water Plan Helps, supra note 38.
82
Knox, supra note 20, at 479.
83
Joel Ngugi, Professor, University of Washington School of Law, Lecture on the Law of Human
Rights (Nov. 16, 2009).
84
See Stephen Carley, Limping Toward Elysium: Impediments Created by the Myth of Westphalia
on Humanitarian Intervention In the International Legal System, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1741, 1743 (2009).
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toward climatic displacement, seeing the climate realm as more of a
scientific than a human problem.85
Even if the human rights movement enveloped climatic displacement,
the track record of human rights efforts reveals serious enforcement
problems.86 Human rights conventions87 require reports only from member
states, so nonmember states and unrecognized states avoid compliance with
the conventions’ provisions.88 Also, international actors have inconsistently
interpreted and incorporated human rights norms into domestic policies.89
Ultimately, human rights norms do not guarantee land rights to displaced
populations.90
4.

Existing Refugee Laws are Inappropriate to Respond to the Unique
Challenges Posed by Climatic Displacement

Existing refugee laws seem to present a natural solution to climatic
displacement, but serious long-term concerns preclude this option. The
international community has been reluctant to label individuals displaced by
climate change as “refugees.”91 “International refugee law . . . was not
designed for those who are left homeless by environmental pressures,” and
ultimately, international law is unfit to deal with the millions of expected
climate refugees.92
Further, the circumstances surrounding climatic
displacement are entirely distinct from circumstances surrounding political
displacement, and a legal solution must consider the unique circumstances of
climate refugees, who are not fleeing from a well-founded fear.93 So far,
only the Finnish and Swedish Aliens Acts recognize environmental
refugees.94 The majority of domestic asylum systems do not accommodate
85
See Mario Osava, Climate Change: Scientific Fact, Not Political Issue, INTER PRESS SERVICE
NEWS AGENCY (Rio De Janeiro), Dec. 19, 2009, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=49754 (last visited
Apr. 12, 2010).
86
Pamala Brondos, International Law: The Use of the Torture Victim Protection Act as an
Enforcement Mechanism, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 221, 225 (1997).
87
International conventions are treaties. CAL. DEP’T OF DEV. SERVICES, CONSUMER ADVISORY
COMM., CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (2009).
88
Brondos, supra note 86, at 225.
89
UNITED NATIONS ENABLE, INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND STANDARDS RELATING TO DISABILITY,
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/comp101.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
90
ICCPR, supra note 79; ICESCR, supra note 80.
91
Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini, Symposium, Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a
Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 383 (2009).
92
See Olesya Dmitracova, Law Change Needed to Cover Climate Exiles: Lawyers, REUTERS INDIA,
Oct. 15, 2009, http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-43164320091015 (last visited Apr. 12,
2010).
93
UNHCR, Forced Displacement, supra note 1.
94
[Swedish Aliens Act] 2005:716 (Swed.); [Finnish Aliens Act] ch. V 31 §, 537/1999,
22.2.1991/378, (Fin.).
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environmental refugees, let alone climate refugees.95 Further, when granted
asylum, refugees are not provided land rights, so a new international legal
mechanism must be created.96
5.

All Four Alternative Legal Mechanisms are Inappropriate to Respond
to Displacement in Kiribati

Ultimately, the challenges posed by climatic displacement are of a
unique breed, and therefore, a new international treaty regime must be
developed to create land rights for climate refugees like the I-Kiribati. Other
available legal mechanisms are inadequate to address Kiribati’s
displacement because no appropriate forum exists for Kiribati to instigate
litigation, the R2P principle does not extend far enough to cover
displacement of I-Kiribati, human rights norms produce inadequate results,
and there are no existing international climate refugee laws to respond to the
displacement of low-lying island populations.
6.

Treaties Represent the Most Appropriate Response Mechanism to
Address Climatic Displacement and Establish Land Rights for
Climate Refugees

Treaties97 are the most appropriate international legal mechanism to
provide land rights to displaced nations due to the inherently global nature of
the climate problem, treaties’ legally binding nature, treaties’ voluntary
nature, and the deliberate nature of the treaty negotiation process.98 For a
number of reasons, I-Kiribati displacement will best be addressed through a
new international treaty guaranteeing land rights.
First, treaties create binding legal obligations.99 Parties to a treaty
internalize compliance, and compliance becomes the international norm.100
Treaties become part of domestic law either automatically without
implementing legislation or through domestic legislation.101 Further, Article
95

See Jessica Cooper, Note, Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee
Definition, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 480 (1998).
96
John Fredricksson, Bridging the Gap Between Rights and Responsibilities: Policy Changes
Affecting Refugees and Immigrants in the United States Since 1996, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 757, 758 (2000).
97
Treaties resemble binding contracts, which international parties enter freely. VAUGHAN LOWE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (2007).
98
See id.
99
Id.
100
See Tseming Yang, International Treaty Enforcement as a Public Good: Institutional Deterrent
Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1131, 1145-46 (2006).
101
David Sloss, Non-Self Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 9 (2002).
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26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is well
established and widely ratified, stipulates that every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties and must be performed in good faith,102 or else states can be
found in violation of the treaty.
Countries breaching treaty obligations may be held liable under
international law.103 Treaty enforcement mechanisms come in both positive
and negative forms.104 Positive enforcement mechanisms create incentives
for compliance, including monetary benefits, political capital, and
transparency.105 Negative enforcement mechanisms are punitive measures
for non-compliance such as reparations, agreement withdrawal, 106 and
membership sanctions.107 Some treaty breaches also have domestic
consequences. For example, in the United States, self-executing treaties
automatically become part of domestic law.108 Thus, in many instances,
treaty rights and obligations may be enforced domestically.109
Second, treaty formation is a voluntary process often involving
lengthy negotiations.110 States entering agreements voluntarily are less
likely to deviate from the carefully crafted terms of the treaty. Nations take
treaty formation seriously becasue treaty breaches may have legal
ramifications.111 States engage in careful deliberation and negotiation to
ensure that their interests will not be detrimentally impacted by positive or
negative enforcement mechanisms.112 This cautious approach works well
regarding climatic displacement, an area of international law still undefined
and full of uncertainty.
Third, the dissemination of treaties influences the formation of
customary international law.113
Customary law represents a set of
international legal norms that become binding after routine state practice and
102
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, July 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Law of Treaties].
103
See Economic Expert, Treaty, http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Treaty.htm (last visited Apr. 14,
2010).
104
Julian Ouellet, Knowledge Base Essay: Enforcement Mechanisms, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY,
Sept. 2004, http://beyondintractability.org/essay/enforcement_mechanisms/?nid=140 (last visited Apr. 12,
2010).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Tseming Yang, supra note 100, at 1137.
108
Sloss, supra note 101, at 10.
109
ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (2005).
110
Colin B. Picker, A View From 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand of
Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 183 (2001).
111
LOWE, supra note 97, at 19.
112
See generally LOWE, supra note 97.
113
See generally Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L.
328, 349 (1987).
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opinio juris114 are established.115 Thus, the treaty process will play an
essential role in shaping future climatic displacement laws.
Finally, treaty development establishes a set of binding legal
principles that parties adhere to without litigation on a case-by-case basis.
States facing serious human impacts of climatic displacement require readily
available assistance.116 The most successful international laws do not
require court action to secure observation.117 Additionally, Article 18 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties mandates that states signing
treaties must restrain from measures that would defeat the purpose and
objective of the treaty.118 Thus, without relying on litigation, signatories and
parties must act in accordance with treaty provisions.
Despite these strengths, treaties are not a perfect model for providing
land rights to displaced nations. The treaty negotiation process may be quite
lengthy;119 parties with less bargaining power may be disenfranchised or
marginalized;120 political considerations inevitably influence negotiations;121
and treaty participation is voluntary.122 Developed nations like the United
States could simply refuse to engage in negotiations. However, absolute
reliance on other available methods like litigation, invocation of R2P, human
rights norms, and existing refugee law is inadequate.123 Thus, formation of
new treaties represents the best mechanism to address climatic displacement
and ensure land rights for climate refugees.
B.

Existing Treaties Suggest Climate Solutions, but Future Regimes Must
Go Further to Address Land Rights

Existing international treaties suggest there is an international legal
duty to respond to climatic displacement, but none of the treaties goes far
enough to provide land rights to displaced island nations. Three treaties
114
Opinio juris refers to a states’ adherence to an international legal norm out of a sense of
obligation. Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 193 (D. Mass. 2004).
115
LOWE, supra note 97, at 19.
116
See Islands Fight the Tide, TVNZ, Jan. 22, 2009, http://tvnz.co.nz/world-news/islands-fight-tide2449866 (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
117
LOWE, supra note 97, at 135.
118
Timo Koivurova, International Legal Avenues to Address the Plight of Victims of Climate
Change: Problems and Prospects, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 267, 275 (2007); Law of Treaties, supra note
103, art. 18.
119
Picker, supra note 110, at 183.
120
Kari Krogseng, National Resources Law: Resource Conservation: Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 771, 781 (2000).
121
Eric P. Schwartz, The United States and the International Criminal Court: The Case for
“Dexterous Multiculturalism,” 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 223, 227 (2003).
122
LOWE, supra note 97, at 19.
123
See supra Part III.A.
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outline potential legal obligations for developed states to provide assistance
to victims of climatic displacement: the Kiribati-United States Treaty of
Friendship and Territorial Sovereignty (“Friendship Treaty”), the South
Pacific Regional Environment Programme (“SPREP”) Agreement, and the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).
These three treaties offer some insight into potentially useful legal
mechanisms and language; however, they all fall short of meeting the needs
of persons displaced by climate change.
1.

The Friendship Treaty Indicates a Legal Responsibility to Provide
Relocation Assistance, but the United States is Unlikely to Act

The United States has a strong historical presence in Kiribati.124 Upon
Kiribati’s independence in 1979, the United States signed the Friendship
Treaty with Kiribati, relinquishing U.S. claims to Kiribati’s Phoenix and
Line Islands.125 Language in the text of the Friendship Treaty creates
potential legal obligations for the United States to assist Kiribati in
environmental crisis caused by rising ocean levels.126
First, Article 2 of the Friendship Treaty promises U.S. assistance in
emergencies, as well as over-arching development aid.127 Article 2 states
that the United States will provide assistance to Kiribati through
collaboration “on matters of mutual concern and interest in time of need.”128
Since this particular Friendship Treaty has never been called upon in court,
there is no precedent against using the language in an expansive manner.129
With rising oceans impacting every level of society, Kiribati faces a
dire “time of need.”130 Climatic displacement qualifies as an issue of
“mutual concern” given the global effects of climatic displacement, and the
United States could interpret the Friendship Treaty to prompt provision of
climate-specific aid to Kiribati, including land rights. Climate change
impacts Kiribati’s fisheries resources, and the United States has an economic

124

See AllGov, Nations, Kiribati, http://www.allgov.com/nation/Kiribati (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
Id.
See Treaty of Friendship and Territorial Sovereignty, U.S.-Kiribati, Sept. 20, 1979, 35 U.S.T.
2095 [hereinafter Friendship Treaty].
127
Id. art. 2. “The two Governments, in the spirit of friendship existing between them, shall consult
together on matters of mutual concern and interest in time of need, and in particular, to promote social and
economic development, peace, and security in the Pacific region.”
128
Id.
129
Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363, 366 (6th Cir. 1984) (discussing the roles that
friendship treaties have played historically).
130
See supra Part II.B.
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interest in South Pacific fisheries.131 Collaboration prompted by mutual
concern could be invaluable for Kiribati, using U.S. resources to put together
adaptation and land rights plans.
Second, Article 2 suggests that through promoting “social and
economic development, peace, and security in the Pacific region,” 132 the
United States could provide aid for relocation and land rights. Economic
development and peace tangentially relate to climatic displacement, but
climate change directly affects security on the island.133 The language of the
treaty does not specify the nature of the threat to security to which the
United States is obligated to respond.134 Rising ocean levels pose a threat to
Kiribati’s security; indeed, rising sea levels could completely wipe out the
nation.135
Despite the responsibilities suggested by Article 2, the United States
has no binding responsibility for a number of reasons. First, the treaty was
designed to transfer occupied territories back to Kiribati.136 Second, any
indications of “security” provisions relate to militaristic security.137 The
United States’ presence in Kiribati was directly linked to militaristic
operations and goals.138 The Senate ratified the treaty during the Cold War
era,139 when security concerns dominated the international agenda.140 When
a U.S. court interprets international treaties, the court gives effect to the
intent of the treaty parties,141 and climate refugees were not a problem at the
time the treaty was signed because concern for climatic displacement
emerged only in recent years.142 Third, the Treaty uses qualifying language
131

U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Kiribati, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1836.htm (last
visited Apr. 12, 2010). Kiribati has a $9.8 million fish, shark, seaweed industry, and the U.S. is one of the
five largest importers of Kiribati’s marine industry. Id.
132
Friendship Treaty, supra note 126, art. 2.
133
See supra Part II.B.
134
Friendship Treaty, supra note 126, art. 2.
135
See supra Part II.B.
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Friendship Treaty, supra note 126, art. 2.
137
Pacific Island Treaties: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong. 1 (1982)
(hearing to consider Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Kiribati-U.S. treaty, signed at Tarawa,
Sept. 20, 1969, to provide for U.S. recognition of the Republic of Kiribati (formerly Gilbert Islands)
sovereignty, to assure nondiscriminatory access to Kiribati fishing grounds which supply fish to American
Samoa canneries, and to protect U.S. security interests).
138
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139
See A Concise Time-Line of the Cold War 1945-1992, 3AD.COM, http://www.3ad.com/history/
cold.war/timeline.cold.war.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
140
See generally Allison Ehlert, Between Empire and Community: The United States and
Multilateralism 2001-2003, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 731, 732 (2003).
141
Sumitomo Shoji America v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982). Parties to a treaty refer to the
states that negotiated, signed, and ratified a treaty.
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http://www.osce.org/documents/eea/2005/05/14488_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
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such as “mutual concern,” “mutual interest,” and “best efforts.”143 The
United States could argue that rising ocean levels and climatic displacement
are not of “mutual concern” or “mutual interest.” The United States may
also suggest that their existing efforts are indeed “best efforts,” absolving
itself of any additional obligation. Fourth, Kiribati would have a difficult
time enforcing the obligations in the treaty, particularly because the United
States is not subject to ICJ jurisdiction.144 Finally, U.S. policy has been
opposed to taking climate related action.145 Given the current economic
crisis, the United States is unlikely to direct climate assistance to Kiribati146
However, the Friendship Treaty is instructive in future climate
responses. If the United States decides to provide climatic assistance to
Kiribati, it could rely on the language of the Friendship Treaty to garner
political support for the decision. Further, Kiribati may approach the United
States through diplomatic channels, using the Friendship Treaty as evidence
for U.S. legal responsibility to provide land rights assistance upon
displacement of the nation. However, the treaty lacks land rights language
so it may not go far enough to respond to climatic displacement.147
2.

The SPREP Agreement Lacks Sufficient Enforcement Mechanisms

Governments of the South Pacific region established SPREP to
maintain environmental quality in the region, including climate change
response, but like the Friendship Treaty, the SPREP Agreement will likely
prove inadequate in providing land rights to climate refugees.148 However,
the treaty does suggest a regional legal responsibility to assist with climate
adaptation.149 The program promotes cooperation and provides assistance in
order to preserve the environment; specifically, the Pacific Futures program
under the SPREP aims to address South Pacific climate vulnerabilities.150
143
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The SPREP Agreement establishes an agenda cognizant of the
challenges presented by climate change and rising ocean levels. Article 2(1)
of the SPREP sets out an action plan creating a system for cooperation,
assistance, and adaptation, although it does not specifically mention climatic
displacement.151 Article 3(5)(c) strengthens the program’s ability to impact
future climate-related efforts by establishing a commitment to future
international environmental treaties.152 The challenges associated with
climate change are likely to become increasingly apparent in the coming
decades, and SPREP involvement in future treaties ensures representation of
South Pacific interests.153
However, critics may argue that the treaty will never induce an
international response to climatic displacement. The agreement lacks
enforceability mechanisms—there are no “punishments” for noncompliance. Further, the SPREP Agreement’s primary utility was to
establish the framework for an international organization, not to create
legally binding environmental guidelines.154 Finally, the SPREP Agreement,
like the Friendship Treaty, is not specifically directed at climate change.
Rather, the regime addresses environmental concerns broadly and says
nothing about land rights or climatic displacement.155
Despite its vague language, the SPREP Agreement may impact future
climate adaptation efforts because its member states include most South
Pacific nations, as well as a number of developed states. The developed
states are held to the same obligations as the Pacific states.156 Ultimately,
SPREP also lacks adequate lands rights action to assist displaced nations.157
3.

The UNFCCC Provides Mechanisms for Valuable International
Collaboration, but the UNFCCC System Responds Slowly

The UNFCCC emerged from the progressive development of the
international environmental law movement, representing the most
comprehensive effort to address climate change on an international level.
151
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International response to climate change began with the establishment of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988.158 The UNFCCC was
adopted at the Rio United Nations (“UN”) Conference on Environment and
Development in 1992 as a broad framework with general objectives and
principles to be refined by future protocols and agreements.159 One hundred
and fifty-two governments, including the United States and the European
Union, ratified the convention.160 The UNFCCC’s language creates specific
international legal obligations to assist climate adaptation,161 and the
framework provides a valuable platform for future adaptation treaties,
including NAPA, a program aimed at providing least developed countries
(“LDCs”) with adaptation program funding and assistance.
UNFCCC language indicates legally binding obligations on a scale
much larger than the Friendship Treaty and the SPREP Agreement, but
significant international response to climatic displacement has yet to
materialize. The relevant sections of the UNFCCC indicate a common and
shared concern for climate effects, “common but differentiated”
contributions and responsive capacities, future climate dangers, necessary
economic considerations, and an emphasis on adaptation mechanisms that
could include land rights.162 Each treaty provision, while vague, could be
read to assist island states like Kiribati with climatic displacement and land
rights acquisition.
The preamble of the UNFCCC recognizes the needs of the parties to
the treaty.163 The first line of the UNFCCC reads, “The Parties to this
Convention, Acknowledging that change in the Earth’s climate and its
adverse effects are a common concern of humankind . . . .”164 The treaty
goes on to elaborate on the global nature of climate change, while indicating
the different roles developed and developing states must take in addressing
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climate change.165 The language “common but differentiated” indicates a
recognition by developed states that part of their role in addressing climate
change must be to provide assistance to countries with lower “respective
capability,” such as small Pacific states like Kiribati.166 The treaty
specifically addresses the vulnerabilities of island nations, recognizing that
“low-lying and other small island countries . . . are particularly vulnerable to
the adverse effects of climate change.”167 Thus, the preamble of the
UNFCCC recognizes the unique position and vulnerability of South Pacific
Islands, targeting these populations for action and assistance with climatic
displacement. Such an acknowledgment hints at moral or ethical obligations
to work to address climate change. However, this language falls short of
being legally enforceable.
Article 4 contains more concrete legal obligations, suggesting further
grounds for international climate relocation aid to small island states like
Kiribati.168 Essential for adaptation mechanisms like land rights provisions,
Article 4(1)(e) encourages cooperation in addressing the effects of climate
change in developing regions.169 The article mandates that states shall
“cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change.”170
“Cooperation,” taken in conjunction with the article’s reference to “common
but differentiated responsibilities,”171 highlights the responsibility for
developed states to provide adaptation and relocation assistance to
developing states like Kiribati.
The UNFCCC specifically addresses adaptation funding mechanisms
in Article 4(4), reinforcing the role of developed states in providing
necessary assistance to developing states.172 Article 4(4) creates a binding
legal obligation that developed countries shall help developing countries like
165
Id. “Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible
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166
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168
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Kiribati meet “costs of adaptation,” which could include land rights.173 The
article does not specify the type of adaptation required to receive funding,
leaving specific determinations to the states involved. Such unspecified
language allows developing states to stipulate their interests, including a
request for land rights, but the language may not require developed states to
listen.
Overall, the UNFCCC has been widely revered and ratified, but the
treaty has not elicited significant international action. The document serves
as a flexible mechanism to facilitate the development of future commitments
and obligations, but the unspecified obligations also allow states, particularly
developed states, to shirk responsibility.174
The preamble and Articles
4(1)(e) and 4(4) all include language suggesting obligations to address
climate change and provide displacement assistance, yet little action has
been taken in the Pacific region to address the effects of climate change
already impacting individuals. The UNFCCC also fails to adequately
discuss land rights provisions upon international climatic displacement.175
C.

NAPA Provides a Feasible Adaptation Model to Provide Land Rights
in Relocation Efforts

Despite UNFCCC’s shortcomings, the UNFCCC Conference of the
Parties process did produce NAPA, which provides a highly viable model for
adaptation and land rights provisions.176 The purpose of NAPA is to address
the immediate needs of individual countries to adapt to the pressing
challenges posed by climate change by providing technical support and
project-specific funding.177 In NAPA applications, countries stipulate their
unique needs and request funding for particular adaptation projects that
could include land rights development programs to assist displaced countries
and host countries to work out relocation plans.178 The program, available
only to the least developed countries, provides funding from the Global
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Environment Facility (“GEF”)179 and access to the Least Developed
Countries Expert Group.180 Preparation of a NAPA application involves
various stakeholders, including local communities.181
To date, the NAPA program has received and accepted applications
from forty-four of the least developed countries, including Kiribati.182
Kiribati’s NAPA application requested funding for ten adaptation projects,
including well improvement, coastal management, and agricultural
development.183 With only a few minor changes to the titles of the
adaptation program components, Kiribati’s NAPA application was accepted
and funded in its entirety.184 Kiribati’s accepted NAPA program will have a
direct impact in the country’s effort to adapt to rising ocean levels, but the
program focuses on the most vulnerable sectors in the most populous
locations, not climatic displacement.185
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING LAND RIGHTS PROVISIONS
USING THE NAPA FRAMEWORK

The NAPA program provides a viable model for creating a new
international treaty to address climatic displacement and provide land rights
to displaced individuals from states like Kiribati. As currently outlined in
the Marrakech Accords, the NAPA program places no monetary cap on
requested contributions.186 Notwithstanding the incredible potential of the
NAPA program, some necessary changes should be made to the NAPA
179
The GEF is a global partnership among 179 countries, including the U.S., international
institutions, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. Global Environment Facility, List of
States Participating in the Restructured GEF, http://www.gefweb.org/interior.aspx?id=210 (last visited Apr.
12, 2010). Since 1991, GEF provided $8.8 billion in grants and $38.7 billion in co-financing for over 2,400
projects in more than 165 countries. Id. at http://www.gefweb.org/interior_right.aspx?id=50 (last visited
Apr. 12, 2010). See generally Mozaharul Alam, The National Adaptation Programme of Action Process,
TIEMPO CLIMATE NEWSWATCH, http://www.tiempocyberclimate.org/newswatch/feature071202.htm (last
visited Apr. 12, 2010).
180
UNFCC, CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES SEVENTH SESSION, MARRAKESH ACCORDS AND THE
MARRAKESH DECLARATION 228 (2001), http://www.unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accords_draft.pdf (last
visited Apr. 12, 2010).
181
Id. at 232.
182
NAPA website, supra note 177.
183
ENV’T & CONSERVATION DIV., MINISTRY OF ENV’T, LAND, AND AGRIC. DEV., REPUBLIC OF
KIRIBATI
NATIONAL
ADAPTATION
PROGRAM
OF
ACTION
36-39,
59-63
(2007),
http://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/kir01.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
184
UNFCCC, NAPA Project Database, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/least_developed_
countries_portal/napa_project_database/items/4583.php (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
185
See Elisabeth Mealey, International Coalition Tackles Impacts of Climate Change in Kiribati,
WORLD BANK, July 18, 2005, http://www.worldbank.org/ (search “International Coalition Tackles Impacts
of Climate Change in Kiribati” in the search bar) (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
186
J. Chris Larson, Racing the Rising Tide: Legal Options for the Marshall Islands, 21 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 495, 510 (2000).

638

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 19 NO. 3

program to provide land rights to climate refugees since NAPA focuses on
immediate needs, not longer-term concerns.187
A.

NAPA Represents a Viable Framework to Provide Land Rights

The NAPA program establishes a viable framework for an
international treaty providing land rights to displaced nations due to its past
success and engagement with local stakeholders. The track record of the
NAPA program indicates an ability and willingness to provide LDCs,
including Kiribati, with requested projects and funding.188 With adequate
increases in available funds, NAPA could be expanded to allow countries to
request relocation assistance and land rights provisions.189 The form of such
assistance will vary by location and displaced nation, but local participation
by threatened states ensures an authentic and appropriate response to the
major challenges faced by climatic displacement of entire nations.190 This
philosophy of local participation could be expanded in a new international
treaty, allowing host countries to engage in the process of establishing land
rights.
B.

The NAPA System Should Be Developed in a New Treaty Regime,
Distinct from the UNFCCC

Although NAPA was developed under the UNFCCC, a new treaty
regime should be created to provide land rights to displaced island nations
like Kiribati. As the failed Copenhagen negotiations indicate,191 the
UNFCCC may be inadequate to respond to climatic displacement due to the
“framework” nature of the convention and the convention’s lack of focus on
climate adaptation. Since displacement of entire nations is an unprecedented
international challenge, an entirely new treaty regime is appropriate. The
new treaty must address the inadequacies of the Friendship Treaty, the
SPREP Agreement, and the UNFCCC, with more definite language and
enforcement mechanisms.192 Rather than undermining or competing with
existing NAPA efforts, the new treaty regime must work with the GEF and
187
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the UNFCCC member states to develop a system that adequately provides
lands rights to displaced nations under NAPA. Parties to the new treaty
would agree to support, either financially or with land grants, an expansion
of the GEF and NAPA to include land rights provisions.
C.

Recommended Improvements to the Existing NAPA System

In order for NAPA to serve as the framework for providing land rights
to climate refugees, some changes must be made to the existing NAPA
system. First, the current scope of NAPA must be dramatically expanded
beyond short-term projects to encompass permanent land rights.193 “A
remaining challenge is the link between current climatic risks and longerterm climate change.”194 Countries thus far have limited their requests under
NAPA to “immediate and urgent” concerns, and no country has requested
land rights provisions or relocation assistance.195 Second, support must be
increased at the implementation stage of NAPA projects to ensure that
projects are fully carried out.196 Some nations complain that they lack
adequate support in final project stages to complete the NAPA process.197
Third, in order to encourage countries to host and provide land rights to
climate refugees, the NAPA funding and project parameters must be
expanded.198 Currently NAPA applications may only be submitted by LDCs;
however, providing land rights in new host countries requires new project
and funding structures that can support the host countries.199 Finally, NAPA
applications should be more fully integrated into existing national
development plans of host countries and countries facing displacement.200
Integration will capitalize on existing efforts and resources, raise awareness,
and promote coordination.201 These four measures will allow a new treaty
regime based on NAPA to accommodate the international influx of climate
refugees and provide land rights to internationally displaced individuals.
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CONCLUSION

Climate change causes rising ocean levels, which threaten the
existence of low-lying Pacific states like Kiribati, and the international
community must be prepared to respond. Developed states have a
responsibility, as the perpetrators of climate change, to use available
resources to assist developing states that imminently face displacement.
International assistance or compensation, combined with local knowledge,
education, and action allows island states to better respond to the threats
posed by climate change.
A future treaty regime to provide land rights for nations displaced by
rising ocean levels must react to the inadequacies of past international
agreements and develop innovative approaches to emerging problems.
Adequate land rights provisions in future displacement treaties will allow
climate refugees to resettle successfully and improve their economic, social,
and cultural positions. “It’s a humbling prospect when a nation has to begin
talking about its own demise, not because of some inevitable natural
disaster . . . but because of what we are doing on this planet.”202 The
international community ought to respond to “what we are doing on this
planet,” take responsibility, and assist Kiribati in addressing their “demise”
appropriately. A new treaty, which expands the current NAPA model to
provide land rights for victims of climatic displacement, will ensure that
climate refugees have the opportunity to relocate successfully when entire
nations disappear under rising ocean levels.
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